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When asked whether subsidies are good or bad, economists gener-
ally give so many different answers that the conclusion can only be: it 
depends. It depends on the objective, the type of subsidy, the benefi -
ciary, the economic context, etc. Precisely because it depends on many 
factors, the European Union (EU) has set up a control mechanism for 
subsidies, or state aid, as the EU calls it, with a view to distinguish the 
“good” from the “bad” subsidies and make sure that only good subsidies 
are granted. This raises two questions: how to determine what a good 
subsidy is, and how to organize a functioning control mechanism.
The following contribution aims to explain in a nutshell how the 
EU system works, what its main features are, and what alternative ap-
proaches could be developed. (For a general overview of the EC State 
aid rules, see, for example, Bilal and Nicolaides [1999]; Biondi, Eeck-
hout, and Flynn [2004]; D’Sa [1998]; Hancher, Ottervanger, and Slot 
[1999]; Heidenhain et al. [2003]; Nicolaides, Kekelekis, and Buyskes 
[2005]; Quigley and Collins [2003]; Sinnaeve [2001].)
SYNOPSIS OF EU STATE AID CONTROL
Why State Aid Control?
State aid control in the EU has existed for almost half a century 
now. Its inclusion in the EC treaty was quite remarkable and novel as 
there were no other examples of comparable state aid disciplines at the 
time.
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Among the reasons for introducing state aid control one could fi rst 
refer to general economic arguments against subsidies: the risk of a 
subsidy race, where EC member states might outbid each other and 
transfer problems from one country to another. This would not only 
be a waste of public money, but in the long term, if companies rely too 
much on state intervention, it could weaken the competitive position of 
European industry. 
The inclusion of state aid rules in the EC treaty is also closely linked 
to the establishment of a common market, where goods and services 
can circulate freely. After the gradual abolition of tariff and nontariff 
barriers to trade, the granting of state aid is one of the few remaining 
tools for national governments to protect their national industry. Barri-
ers to trade that have been dismantled in the integration process should 
not be replaced by other barriers in the form of state aid. Therefore, 
strict control is necessary also from a common market perspective. At 
the same time, as markets become more integrated the distortive effects 
of state aid are more visible and more directly felt by competitors in 
other member states, thus requiring state aid disciplines.
Finally, it is important to underline that the state aid provisions were 
inserted in the competition chapter of the EC treaty. The logic of the 
treaty is to ensure undistorted competition regardless of whether distor-
tions are caused by the behavior of businesses, for which the antitrust 
rules were adopted, or by the action of the state. State aid control should 
thus be seen in the light of its role to avoid unjustifi ed distortions of 
competition. (For a comparison of EU and the United States in the ap-
plication of competition policy against state intervention in the market, 
see Ichikawa [2004, p. 555].)
The Defi nition of State Aid
The treaty uses a rather wide defi nition of state aid. (For an over-
view of recent developments regarding the defi nition of state aid pursu-
ant to Article 87 [1] EC Treaty, see Winter [2004, p. 475].) It includes 
all advantages selectively granted by the state or through state resources 
that distort competition or threaten to distort it and affect trade between 
member states, e.g., grants, loans at nonmarket conditions, state guar-
antees, all types of tax advantages, and the sale of land at nonmarket 
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conditions. This notion is broadly comparable, although not identical, 
with that of a subsidy under the WTO rules.
The selectivity criterion (i.e., whether an aid measure is specifi c or 
selective) is determined at the level of each member state. This implies 
that if member states apply different levels of taxes, this is not consid-
ered to be state aid. If, however, they lower the tax rate or grant other 
types of tax advantages only to certain sectors, certain types of enter-
prises (such as small and medium-sized enterprises [SME] or coordina-
tion centers for multinational companies), or enterprises located in a 
certain area within the territory of a member state, this would constitute 
state aid and must respect the relevant conditions.1
The Substantive Rules of State Aid Control
What does the EU control mechanism look like? The treaty starts 
from the principle that state aid is incompatible with the common mar-
ket, unless it falls under one of the exceptions of the treaty (Article 87). 
The Commission has the power to decide whether or not this is the 
case. The exceptions are formulated in a very general way (they refer, 
for example, to broad concepts such as the development of regions with 
an abnormally low living standard or serious underemployment, and 
the development of certain economic activities). As a result, the treaty 
gives the Commission wide discretion to develop criteria for the ap-
proval of certain types of aid and design a state aid policy. This policy 
will necessarily evolve in the same way as the common market and the 
EU objectives.
The basic principles, however, remain the same: the aid should con-
tribute to the achievement of EU objectives in such a way that the distor-
tion of competition is justifi able. Aid by defi nition distorts competition. 
The reason why it can nevertheless be authorized lies in the fact that 
it promotes other EU objectives, such as regional development, R&D, 
employment, etc., which outweigh the distortion in a proportional way. 
In other words: if market forces alone are suffi cient to attain the EU 
objective, no aid should be granted, but where the benefi ts to the EU as 
a whole exceed those that would result from undistorted competition, 
authorization is justifi ed.
It is clear that these general principles need to be embodied in more 
operational criteria. The Commission has therefore translated the prin-
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ciples into concrete assessment criteria, which are laid down in frame-
works and guidelines.2 These quasi-legislative texts defi ne the condi-
tions under which aid projects can be authorized for different types 
of aid, specifi cally aid for regional development, promotion of SME, 
employment, R&D, environmental protection, training of workers, 
restructuring of enterprises in diffi culties, and provision of risk capi-
tal—to mention the most important objectives. They aim at ensuring 
greater legal certainty for member states and companies, predictability, 
and equal treatment.
For each of these horizontal objectives, a number of precise condi-
tions defi ne under which circumstances aid can be granted. Normally 
a maximum aid intensity will be determined. This is the maximum 
amount of aid, expressed as a percentage of the eligible costs. These 
percentages are further modulated according to the size of the aid bene-
fi ciaries (small enterprises can, as a rule, receive higher amounts of aid) 
and the region where they are located (higher aid is allowed in poorer 
regions). (On regional aid, see also Battista [2005]; Nicolaides [2003, 
p. 543]; and Wishlade [2003].) For example, a company setting up a 
new plant in a poor Portuguese region can receive a higher aid amount 
than if it had established its new plant in the Netherlands. If the com-
pany is a small enterprise, it can also get an SME bonus. If, however, a 
member state wants to grant the company a straight tax break without 
any condition, this will normally not be authorized by the Commission 
because there is no direct counterpart for the aid (such as new invest-
ment or job creation).
State Aid Procedures
In procedural terms, Article 88 of the EC treaty establishes a mech-
anism of prior control, based on the notifi cation obligation and the 
standstill clause. (On state aid procedures, see Sinnaeve and Slot [1999, 
p. 1153].) Member states have to notify in advance all their aid projects 
to the Commission and may only implement them after the Commis-
sion has given its green light.
Simple cases are decided after a preliminary examination within 
two months starting from the receipt of a complete notifi cation. For 
more complex cases that raise doubts about their compatibility with the 
common market, the Commission will open a formal investigation after 
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the preliminary examination. In this second phase, all interested parties, 
in particular the aid benefi ciary and its competitors, have the opportu-
nity to present their comments on the aid project.
If member states do not respect these procedural obligations, the 
aid is granted unlawfully and the Commission can at any time start an 
investigation, e.g., following a complaint by a competitor or ex offi -
cio. If the Commission fi nds that the unlawful aid is incompatible with 
the common market, it will order its reimbursement, with interests. Aid 
grantors (and aid benefi ciaries) thus run a serious risk if they do not 
follow the rules.
SOME REFLECTIONS BASED ON THE EU EXPERIENCE
Strengths of the EU System
One of the main strengths of the EU regime is obviously the fact 
that it has the legal and institutional framework for conducting state aid 
control; it has the following necessary means at its disposal to make the 
control system work: 
• an independent authority (the Commission) to set and enforce 
the rules under the control of the EC Court of Justice. 
• the legal and administrative mechanisms to organize the system 
of prior notifi cation and authorization. 
• fl exibility, that is, the option to adapt the rules if changes in the 
economic environment or in the priorities of the EU require so. 
For example, if Europe underinvests in R&D, that will be taken 
into account when the rules on aid for R&D are revised; if on the 
other hand certain sectors suffer from overcapacity or serious 
structural problems, a more restrictive aid policy will be adopted 
(see, for example, European Commission [2002]). When mem-
ber states recently started to use the provision of venture-capital 
as a tool to assist enterprises, the Commission adopted a com-
munication in order to clarify in what circumstances such actions 
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would fall within the scope of the state aid rules and what condi-
tions had to be respected (European Commission 2001).
• the necessary acceptance by all the actors involved (governments, 
industry, public at large) and the recognition that aid disciplines 
are needed in a common market like the EU. Of course, state aid 
control is also subject to criticism, but not more than any other 
policy. What contributes to this acceptance is the fact that the 
state aid regime still leaves suffi cient room to member states for 
developing their economic policies including subsidies. There is 
no general interdiction of state aid; member states can still grant 
all types of aid (except export aid and local content aid, forbid-
den under the WTO rules), they only have to respect certain con-
ditions. The more distortive the aid is, the stricter the conditions 
will be, but the approach is balanced and makes sense from a 
common market perspective.
Not all of these features of the EU regime are necessarily indispens-
able, but they certainly facilitate the functioning of the system.
Can the EU system then be called a success? Probably, since it has 
fulfi lled the objectives rather well. The most distortive types of aid are 
under control. Very strict conditions are applied to 
• operating aid, i.e., aid typically granted without any condition 
or counterpart, which relieves an enterprise of the expenses it 
would itself normally have to bear in its day-to-day management 
or its usual activities (Siemens v. Commission 1997).
• aid to large enterprises in rich areas of the EU.
• sectoral aid. The Commission’s policy favors aid with horizontal 
objectives (e.g., SME development, R&D, and worker training) 
and takes a strict approach on sectoral aid, limited to particular 
sectors of the economy, such as steel.
• aid to enterprises in diffi culty. While it used to be normal for the 
state to intervene in order to save jobs, such intervention now is 
only allowed under very strict conditions. The company must 
fi rst provide a viable restructuring plan, and it must make a sig-
nifi cant contribution and reduce its capacity on the market in or-
der to compensate for the distortion. Furthermore, the one-time 
last-time principle applies according to which restructuring aid 
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is allowed only once. These conditions are important because 
restructuring aid is one of the most distortive types of state aid. 
The fact that both the Commission’s decision and/or its nonim-
plementation can be challenged before the Court offers an ad-
ditional guarantee in order to ensure that the said conditions are 
respected and enforced. 
In brief, the most distortive types of aid are under control, and in ad-
dition, the rules normally also ensure that aid is not the main reason for 
a company to make certain decisions. For example, the aid allowed can 
rarely be so substantial that a company would decide to delocate merely 
because of that aid. Other factors, such as infrastructure, presence of 
trained workforce, general tax levels, and administrative procedures 
to be complied with, are more decisive. But if a company considers 
several alternative locations for a new plant, all of which meet its spe-
cifi c investment requirements, it may choose the site in a disadvantaged 
area, because it can get a comparatively higher aid amount there. This 
is fully in line with the EU’s “cohesion policy.”
Weaknesses of the EU System
Like any system, EU state aid control also has its weaknesses, some 
of which have been tackled already, others would require further reform 
action.
A fi rst problem is the high administrative burden that results from 
the notifi cation obligation. If the Commission had to assess every sin-
gle measure, however small and unimportant, this would be unfeasible 
and an ineffi cient use of resources. Therefore, the obligation of prior 
notifi cation has been softened. Member states can notify so-called aid 
schemes, which defi ne the general conditions under which a certain 
type of aid will be granted. If the scheme complies with the rules, it will 
be approved for a certain number of years and the individual applica-
tions of the scheme do not need to be notifi ed anymore. Furthermore, 
in recent years a number of block exemption regulations have been ad-
opted for certain less distortive types of aid. (On the block exemptions, 
see Sinnaeve [2001, p. 1479].) They exempt, for example, aid for SME, 
and aid for employment or training of workers under well-defi ned con-
ditions from the notifi cation obligation. Block exemptions liberate the 
Commission from a number of routine cases, so that the Commission 
up07amritcCh.4.indd   93 4/11/2008   10:39:14 AM
94   Sinnaeve
can concentrate on the more problematic cases. However, they also 
shift part of the responsibility to the aid grantors, which now have to 
control themselves whether their aid projects fulfi ll the conditions of 
the block exemption. Therefore, in order to avoid a weakening of the 
control system, increased ex-post monitoring, as well as the vigilance 
of competitors, who can complain to the Commission or go to national 
courts if the conditions of a block exemption are infringed is of utmost 
importance.
Block exemptions are also a good illustration of a second diffi culty, 
that is, fi nding the right balance between the need for legal certainty, 
with simple and predictable rules, and the risk that such predefi ned 
rules leave no room to take account of the merits of each individual 
case. In theory the Commission has a wide discretion to decide in every 
case whether a subsidy is good or bad. However, member states and 
enterprises call for clear and transparent assessment criteria, which also 
ensure equal treatment. The Commission has over the years replied to 
this justifi ed request by establishing rather precise rules for most types 
of aid. Once established, these rules bind the Commission and thus in 
practice considerably reduce its discretionary power. This leads to a 
situation where member states feel obliged to consider only aid mea-
sures fi tting within the established criteria, even if other creative new 
projects might be equally defendable or even more effi cient to achieve 
the objectives. Vice versa, the Commission cannot prohibit measures 
that fulfi ll the criteria of its block exemptions or guidelines, even if a 
particular case does not seem very convincing. This permanent tension 
between individual discretion and legal certainty is, however, inherent 
to all legislation and unavoidable. Like any legislator, the Commission 
is challenged to fi nd the right balance in this respect.
A third diffi culty worth mentioning is the fact that the EU control 
mechanism is not designed to ensure that aid measures are economi-
cally effi cient. This fact should probably not be called a weakness, as it 
is simply the consequence of how the system was conceived: State aid 
policy is part of competition policy and its fi rst aim is to limit distor-
tions of competition. The paradox is that the most distortive aid may 
also be the most effi cient in terms of achieving the goal of the aid pro-
vider. For example, tax holidays are likely to attract investments, but 
they distort both competition and the level playing fi eld between enter-
prises too much to be acceptable in a common market. Conversely, aid 
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schemes that do not create signifi cant distortions might get a Commis-
sion approval, even if they are not so effi cient, such as because the aid 
is too small to have an effect (a small tax advantage for the recruitment 
of new workers may not create any jobs which would not have been 
created anyhow). The Commission is reluctant to take a position on 
the effi ciency of a proposed aid measure, also in view of the division 
of powers between member states and the Commission. Ultimately it 
is up to member states to decide how they pursue an economic policy 
adapted to their own situations and spend—or waste—money.
This does not mean, however, that effi ciency plays no role in the 
assessment of state aid. If aid were completely ineffi cient it would not 
normally be authorizable, as it could hardly be considered to be in the 
interest of the EU. To some extent effi ciency requirements are thus in-
corporated in the conditions for authorization. They ensure, for exam-
ple, that 1) for any aid there must be a signifi cant counterpart from the 
company, such as job creation; 2) the enterprise must make a substantial 
own contribution (aid can never fi nance the whole project); and 3) if 
aid is granted for investment or job creation, the investment or the jobs 
must effectively be maintained for a certain number of years. But these 
criteria are defi ned at a general level and are not conceived to select 
the most effi cient measure in a particular case. The Commission thus 
will not analyze whether other measures might be more appropriate and 
more effi cient than state aid. That is left to member states.
In this respect the question may be raised whether more prior and ex 
post assessment should be done before and after aid is granted. For ex-
ample, member states should more often make a study concerning what 
type of economic measures would be most appropriate before having 
recourse to state aid. Currently this indispensable preliminary question 
is often ignored. Similarly, during the operation of an aid scheme, a 
study of its impact could be useful so that adjustments could be made 
in case the objectives are not reached. But here a time problem exists: 
aid schemes have a limited duration of normally fi ve years. Before the 
effects can be seen and a study can be completed, the scheme often 
already comes to an end. In any event, it could be argued that, as a mini-
mum, some kind of ex post assessment on the effects of aid measures 
should be required. That way, aid grantors could benefi t from the expe-
rience when considering new aid measures or the extension of existing 
ones. At the same time the Commission would be better equipped to 
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evaluate and adapt its own policy. The Commission has recently made 
attempts to encourage member states to carry out such assessments, as 
with the “Scoreboard project,” which is published online.3 The Com-
mission also is refl ecting on how to introduce more economic analysis 
in its assessment of state aid (Hancher 2005, p. 425). However, leaving 
aside some ad hoc initiatives, it can be argued that so far, not enough 
emphasis is put on this aspect.
A fi nal problem is the volume of illegal aid. It must be recognized 
that a signifi cant number of aid measures is still granted without autho-
rization (Nicolaides 2002, p. 249). This is explained partially by the fact 
that local and regional aid providers especially lack awareness of the 
rules or infringed the notifi cation obligation because they believed that 
their measure did not constitute state aid—given the relative unclarities 
left by the state aid defi nition it is often far from obvious what is aid 
and what is not. It may also be the result of a deliberate decision of the 
granting authority to take the risk. 
Many of these cases are discovered by the Commission, either be-
cause competitors complain or because politicians publicly announce 
what action they took to stimulate the local industry. But certainly a 
number of aid measures will always remain unknown. Is this a real 
problem? One should not overestimate it. First, if there is a big distor-
tion and a real competition problem, this cannot be hidden. Competi-
tors will know and will complain to the Commission. Secondly, there 
is a powerful remedy: if the illegal aid does not fulfi ll the conditions 
for ex post authorization, the Commission will order its recovery, with 
interests. And reimbursement can go back for 10 years. The recovery 
procedure may be long and cumbersome, because it is the member state 
who has to recover from the benefi ciary and the latter may exhaust all 
remedies under national law against the reimbursement. But the juris-
prudence of the EU is such that ultimately reimbursement will have to 
take place. And although repayment can, of course, not always fully 
redress the distortion of competition, especially after several years, 
the recovery rules are an important deterrent to prevent the granting of 
clearly incompatible aid. Moreover, compared to the WTO rules, for 
example, they defi nitely increase the effi ciency of the EU system. The 
recovery tool is therefore, despite some weak points, a strength of the 
EU state aid policy.
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THE EU SYSTEM AS A MODEL?
Since the EU experience is overall quite positive, the question arises 
of whether and how it could be a model for other jurisdictions. Again, 
the answer should probably be: it depends. One has to recognize that 
EU state aid control is linked to the common market and competition 
policy. The system as such can therefore probably only be successfully 
transposed to groups of countries or regions with a comparable level of 
economic integration and also the political will to entrust an indepen-
dent authority with the power to determine the common interest of all 
members, with all the repercussions this may have on economic, social, 
environmental, and other policy areas.
Such groups of countries exist. For example, the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority fulfi lls the same role as the European Commission for Nor-
way, Iceland and Liechtenstein (in the past also for Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden) (Antoniadis 2002, p. 157). This example proves that EU 
state aid control is not unique.
Another interesting, somewhat different example of subsidy control 
is that, of the 14 accession candidates, 10 meanwhile became members 
of the EU on May 1, 2004.4 In view of the importance attached to state 
aid policy, the EU concluded with these countries, well before acces-
sion, bilateral agreements on the basis of which they were required to 
respect the State aid regime of the EU, as a kind of preparation for ac-
cession. The practical implementation of this obligation was not easy, 
since none of the accession candidates had any experience with State 
aid control. They all set up separate State aid authorities from scratch 
and created the necessary legislative framework to comply with this 
new task. Obviously this process was not completely successful for all 
countries, but it proved its value, not only as a transitional solution in 
the run up to EU accession, but also as a model for state aid control at 
the national level. It has shown that state aid control, not by a suprana-
tional authority but at the national level, can work, provided the state 
aid authority has the necessary legal framework, administrative capac-
ity and functional independence from the grantors of state aid. The state 
aid authorities should function in a comparable way as competition au-
thorities. In federal states, such a system might be an option in order to 
avoid interstate or even intercity bidding wars.
up07amritcCh.4.indd   97 4/11/2008   10:39:15 AM
98   Sinnaeve
Organizing state aid control by an independent state aid authority 
does not necessarily mean that the system must be a copy of the EU, 
which is admittedly rather heavy. Both in terms of procedural enforce-
ment and of substance, a “light” version can be imagined. For example, 
procedurally one could exempt all the less-important cases and set such 
a threshold that only the big cases are subject to control, in order not 
to overload the system. One could also replace the general prohibition 
with exceptions after prior authorization by its opposite: all aid is al-
lowed unless it is forbidden. Or one could replace it by a system where 
enterprises or other regions have a right to complain if they suffer from 
subsidies granted elsewhere (a sort of actionable subsidies within a cer-
tain jurisdiction). In regard to the substantive rules, one could envisage 
only some basic, minimum criteria (e.g., defi ne specifi c objectives for 
which aid can be granted and the conditions which the recipient must 
achieve, put a cap on the aid amount, etc.), or detailed rules for the most 
problematic types of aid. 
The alternative to organize state aid control without a separate state 
aid authority, for example, through legislation by which all aid grantors 
are bound, is probably more diffi cult. In such regime, the rules would 
have to be agreed by national, regional, or local governments, which 
would weaken the whole mechanism and in practice be very diffi cult if 
the rules should go beyond some minimum conditions. Furthermore, in 
a system without independent authority to apply, with a certain margin 
of discretion, the predefi ned rules to a concrete case, there would be 
no fl exibility. The rules would have to be exhaustive, and their regular 
update in function of economic developments would be cumbersome. 
Moreover, the question arises as to who would control and enforce the 
rules? Presumably, in the absence of a central state aid authority, the 
rules should be enforceable through the courts, but that would again cre-
ate problems. Therefore, this alternative seems to be less promising.
Ultimately, to what extent the EU system can be a model depends 
thus on the situation and the objectives one pursues. Creating an inde-
pendent authority to set and enforce the rules is certainly a big step but 
an easier starting point for a well-functioning system. However, other 
less ambitious options should not be disregarded, even if they would 
just consist of some general minimum requirements, as that would still 
be better than having no rules at all. 
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CONCLUSION
To make a proper evaluation of the EU system, one would in fact 
have to compare the current regime with a situation without any state 
aid control. Only such a hypothetical comparison would demonstrate 
the full impact of the system. 
While it is obviously not possible within the scope of this chapter 
to go through this exercise, it may be expected that, in broad terms, it 
would reveal that:
• The EU system strikes a reasonable balance between limiting 
distortions of competition caused by aid, and allowing measures 
that promote EU objectives; since all aid, and especially the most 
distortive types of aid, are subject to conditions, the distortions 
are kept to an acceptable level.
• Since the rules are rather precise and transparent, many cases 
will never be proposed in the fi rst place. Member states are gen-
erally well aware of the basic principles; therefore, they will plan 
their interventions accordingly and not propose any “unworthy” 
projects. Any discussion with the Commission will then more 
be on the details of the project than on the broad characteristics. 
An important part of the impact of the EU system therefore lies 
in all the potentially distortive measures that were never even 
considered, or were withdrawn when it became apparent that no 
approval could be expected.
To conclude, the EU regime perhaps is not perfect, but it works well 
and there seems to be no reason why many elements of it would not be 
useful also in a different context.
Notes
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and should not be attributed to 
the European Commission.
 1.  For the defi nition of an SME, see European Commission (2003). On the applica-
tion of the defi nition of state aid to tax measures, see Luja (2003) and Rossi-Mac-
canico (2004, p. 229).
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 2. An overview of the currently applicable rules can be found at http://europa
.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation (accessed August 9, 2006).
 3. http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/ (accessed August 9, 
2006).
 4. On May 1, 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU. Bulgaria and Roma-
nia are expected to join in 2007. Turkey and Croatia are also candidate countries. 
See Schütterle (2002, p. 79; 2005, p. 255).
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